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Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function
can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles
posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they
appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a
structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that
OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account
about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of
ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach
to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and
I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis
kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework
of metaphysical coherentism.
1 Introduction
Lam (2015) and Esfeld (2017) have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave
function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental par-
ticles posited by the theory. Furthermore, in order to further characterize the nature of
this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). Broadly
speaking, “OSR is any form of structural realism based on an ontological or metaphys-
ical thesis that inflates the ontological priority of structure and relations” (Ladyman,
2014). By adopting this strategy, Lam and Esfeld do not simply provide a structuralist
interpretation about the ontological status of the wave function alone - rather, they are
proposing a more general structuralist account of the ontology of Bohmian mechanics,
which concerns the nature of both the wave function and the Bohmian particles.1 In
fact, OSR is a view that provides us with a rich ontological picture that concerns the
status of both structures and objects. More precisely, as stated by Ladyman and Ross:
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1I am grateful to one anonymous reviewer for helping me to make this point clear.
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Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) is the view that the world has an objec-
tive modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not
supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. According to
OSR, even the identity and individuality of objects depends on the relational
structure of the world. (Ladyman and Ross, 2007: 130)
However, it should be pointed out that OSR does not denote a unique view. Rather,
it refers to a family of very different positions. Distinct versions of OSR disagree about
what kind of entities exist fundamentally and about the exact putative relationship
between structures and objects. Furthermore - as I will argue - OSR is not the only
framework which is compatible with a structuralist-like interpretation of Bohmian me-
chanics. Therefore, a lot more can be said, besides the claim that the wave function
should be regarded as a structure.
My aim for this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I will confront the main dif-
ferent forms of OSR with Bohmian mechanics. I shall point out that all but one are
fundamentally at odds with the intuitive picture suggested by the formalism of Bohmian
mechanics. On the other hand, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist
interpretation of Bohmian mechanics, based on metaphysical coherentism.
The latter account - which has been recently developed by Calosi and Morganti (2018)
and Morganti (2019; 2020) in opposition to OSR - takes objects as fundamental, provided
that an essential part of their qualitative profile stems from ‘same-level’ symmetric rela-
tions of ontological dependence between the objects themselves. This framework provides
an object-first ontology, but preserves nonetheless certain structuralist/holistic insights,
since it holds that the nature of fundamental objects is not wholly characterizable solely
in terms of intrinsic and independent properties. I will argue that we can interpret the
wave function in Bohmian mechanics as stemming from the network of dependence rela-
tions between the particles postulated by metaphysical coherentism (from now onward,
‘coherentism’).
The plan for the paper is as follows. In the next section, I will briefly introduce
Bohmian mechanics, in order to provide the basic technical information which are needed
for the development of the rest of the paper. In the third section, I will introduce the
structuralist approach to Bohmian mechanics and discuss how it can be spelt out in
terms of the main standard versions of OSR. Finally, in the fourth section I shall put
forward and discuss the coherentist account.
2 Bohmian Mechanics and Primitive Ontology
Bohmian mechanics is a non-local hidden variable quantum theory whose crucial claim
is that particles possess definite positions at all times. According to the standard in-
terpretation of Bohmian mechanics, these particles are objects living in ordinary three-
dimensional space.2 That is, the three-dimensionally located particles constitute the
2Alternatively, Bohmian mechanics can be interpreted as postulating a unique particle living in a 3N-
dimensional space, taking the wave function as a field defined over that high-dimensional space (Albert,
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so-called primitive ontology of the theory. In the words of Dürr et al. (2012: 29), “the
basic kind of entities that are to be the building blocks of everything else (except, of
course, the wave function) [are] particles, described by their positions in space, changing
with time.”.
Bohmian mechanics describes quantum systems via the standard wave function
ψ=ψ(q1, ..., qn), for an N -particle system, and - differently from orthodox quantum me-
chanics - specifies the actual positions Q1, ..., Qn of the particles that define the config-
uration Q.3 Furthermore, alongside the standard Schrödinger equation describing the
evolution of the wave function, Bohmian mechanics assumes also a guidance equation,
which is an equation about the motion of the particles. The two fundamental equations
of the theory can be stated as follows:4
(1) Schrödinger equation: ih̄∂ψ∂t = Ĥψ






ψ∗ψ (Q1, ..., Qn)
}
Here Qk and mk denote respectively the position and the mass of the k-th particle,
h̄ is Planck’s constant, Ĥ is the Schrödinger Hamiltonian. Thus, we can say that within
this quantum theory the wave function fixes - through the guidance equation above -
the temporal evolution of the Bohmian particles.5
Three points should be noticed. First, the fundamental wave function for Bohmian
mechanics is the universal wave function, i.e. the wave function of the universe, that is
the biggest N -particles system. Secondly, Bohmian mechanics is non-local, thanks to the
fact that - due to the guidance equation - the velocity of each particle at a time t depends
on the position of each other particle in the configuration at that same time t.6 Finally,
concerning the relation between the wave function and the primitive ontology within
Bohmian mechanics, we can say that the theory is fundamentally about the behaviour
of particles. As Goldstein (2017: 13-14, italics added) claims, “in this sense, for Bohmian
mechanics the particles are primary, or primitive, while the wave function is secondary,
or derivative”.7
That being said, Bohmian mechanics raises some important questions. First of all,
what does the wave function, and in particular the universal wave function, represent in
the world? How is it metaphysically related with the primitive ontology of the theory,
besides what we have said so far? That is, what is the fundamental ontology of the
world according to Bohmian mechanics? Should it include both the particles and the
wave function? Several possible answers are available to these questions. That is, sev-
eral different metaphysical accounts about the nature of the wave function in Bohmian
mechanics are viable. In this paper I will focus on the structuralist stance.
1996). For the purpose of this paper, I shall focus only on the ‘three-dimensionalist’ view.
3Here I follow Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013) and I use q1, ..., qn for generic position and configuration
variables and Q1, ..., Qn for the actual positions.
4Cf. Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013).
5See e.g. Lam (2015: 86).
6See Tumulka (2018: 8).
7The same position is shared also by Allori et al. (2008: 356).
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3 The OSR Interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics
3.1 Lam and Esfeld’s structuralist proposal
Several accounts have been proposed concerning the nature of the universal wave func-
tion.8 For example, some have proposed to treat it as a law of nature (e.g. Goldstein and
Zangh̀ı (2013)), while others have interpreted it as denoting a dispositional property (e.g.
Esfeld et al. (2013), Suarez (2015)). Here I will focus on another position, namely the
structuralist view, which has been recently sketched by Lam (2015) and Esfeld (2017).
This account takes the wave function as corresponding to a network of relations
instantiated by the entities belonging to the primitive ontology in three-dimensional
space. According to Lam and Esfeld, we should interpret this structure in terms of
OSR.9 Thus, the structure at stake is said to be metaphysically fundamental, and the
relata are somehow dependent on it. More precisely, their central claim is the following:
The wave function is understood in terms of a concrete, physical structure in-
stantiated by the Bohmian particles. [...] For each Bohmian particle, the fact
of being this very particle, which includes its own trajectory and dynamical
features, depends on the structure it is part of. (Lam, 2015: 88-89)
What they argue is that the wave function is a physical structure that relates the
position of all the particles, in such a way that “the temporal development of the position
of each particle (i.e. its velocity) depends on the positions of all the other particles” (Es-
feld, 2017: 2337). Notice that, according to this proposal, the structure exists over and
above the elements of the primitive ontology. That is, the relations which connect all the
Bohmian particles are not supervenient on the intrinsic properties of those particles. On
the contrary, they are fundamental, and the qualitative profile of the particles depends
on the structure they belong to. In this way, as mentioned at the beginning, Lam and
Esfeld - by providing an OSR interpretation about the nature of the wave function in
this quantum theory - are sketching a structuralist account about the whole ontology of
Bohmian mechanics.
Esfeld and Lam do not say much more about the nature of the structure invoked.
However, there is more to be said, since this notion of structure and its relationship
with the particles can be spelt out in different and more precise ways. Do structures
and objects both exist? Are they both fundamental? How are they related precisely?
Different structuralist accounts - and, especially, different versions of OSR - entail differ-
ent ontologies. Therefore, it is necessary to specify in which way the structure invoked
by Lam and Esfeld should be interpreted if we want to understand which metaphysical
picture of the world is implied by their view.
8See Belot (2013), Ney and Albert (2015) and Chen (2019) for a complete overview.
9See for example Ladyman et al. (2007) and French (2014). Actually, if we consider the general
philosophical framework underlying OSR, as it can be found e.g. in Ladyman et al. (2007), it is clear
that OSR is strictly connected with a strong empiricist stance, which could be said to be conflicting
with the project of Bohmian mechanics. However, I am focusing here just on the strictly metaphysical
aspects of OSR, as Lam and Esfeld - and a large part of the literature - seem to do.
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To be fair, Esfeld (2017: 2338) himself gives some suggestions about how one can
interpret in a more precise way his structuralist proposal, but I think they are uncon-
vincing. He suggests that we can take this structure to be either a primitive law of
nature instantiated by the universe, or a holistic dispositional property instantiated by
the totality of the particles - following the account developed in Esfeld et al. (2013). As
they claim, “On this view, the universal wave-function, Ψt, of the system of particles
at a given time is a mathematical object that represents the disposition to move in a
certain manner at that time.” (Esfeld et al., 2013: 13). However, both these accounts
seem to conflict with the proposal according to which the wave function is a (physical)
structure. On the one hand, the nomological view interprets it as a law of nature, while
on the other hand the dispositional account interprets it as an intrinsic property. Ar-
guably, neither of these two kinds of entities fall under the category of ‘structures’, nor
are they ascribable to the forms of OSR that are discussed in the literature. Therefore,
since Esfeld and Lam appeal explicitly to the framework of OSR - and given that this is
arguably a distinct framework from the dispositionalist and the nomological ones men-
tioned above, which should be taken as alternative possible accounts - I will try to spell
out their view in standard OSR terms. That is, before conflating the structuralist view
with the dispositionalist or nomological accounts, let’s see if there are other ways - closer
to the structuralist framework as it is discussed in the philosophy of science - to account
for the nature of the wave function as a structure.
3.2 The OSR interpretation made precise
Given that Esfeld and Lam describe their account as a form of OSR, we can begin by
pointing out that OSR is not a single view, but comprises a family of different positions.
In the following, I will consider the main forms of OSR and check how they combine with
the structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics which Esfeld and Lam have put
forward. Thus, I shall focus on eliminativist, priority-based and moderate OSR. All these
three versions of OSR are suitable forms of OSR, but they entail different ontologies.
This means that Lam and Esfeld’s structuralist proposal - as I have presented it - cannot
give univocal answers to the questions which I have raised at the end of the last section.
Thus, it is incomplete. Structuralism cannot be considered as an adequate metaphysical
account of Bohmian mechanics until it tells us what is the fundamental ontology of the
theory. Therefore, we have first to set out which version of OSR best fits Bohmian
mechanics.
Moreover, as I said, Lam and Esfeld define the wave function as a structure in OSR
terms. However, I shall argue that the structuralist interpretation can be formulated
also via a different framework, i.e. coherentism. This theory embeds a different ontology
from every one of the three OSR accounts aforementioned. I shall suggest that the
coherentist proposal preserves some of the basic intuitions of the structuralist view, but
it displays some advantages over the OSR-formulations of the theory.
This section is devoted to OSR. Something which is shared by all the three standard
versions of OSR is the claim that structural elements are amongst the most fundamental
entities composing reality. Moreover, all the forms of OSR support the claim that the
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objects existing at the fundamental level (if they exist at all) depend - in some sense to
be specified - on the structure they belong to.
Let’s start by considering eliminativist OSR. Roughly speaking, according to this
theory structures are all there is to the world.10 Thus, one can combine this view
with Bohmian mechanics by eliminating the Bohmian particles from the ontology of
the theory. However, it seems that we cannot take seriously this option in our context.
In fact, this would amount to the elimination of the primitive ontology. But, on the
contrary, Lam and Esfeld are explicitly committed to the existence of Bohmian particles
in three-dimensional space. Thus, it seems clear that this version of OSR is not the
kind of OSR account they are thinking about, and we can set this aside right away.
Therefore, we should rather focus on priority-based or moderate OSR, which grant at
least some minimal ontological status to particles. Indeed, these two latter theories
posit both particles and structures, and disagree only on the direction and the kind of
dependence11 relation between the two categories of entities.
Consider firstly priority-based OSR. Roughly speaking, according to this thesis
structures are ontologically prior to (or more fundamental than) objects. Nonetheless,
both categories of entities are considered equally existent. In the recent literature, this
kind of dependence has been formulated in terms of grounding (McKenzie (2017; 2020)).
For our purpose it will be enough to characterize grounding in the following way. One
entity x can be said to ground another entity y only if x metaphysically determines y
- that is, only if the obtaining of x constitutes a sufficient condition for the existence
of y12 (Fine, 2015). As McKenzie claims, only if we understand priority in terms of
determination – and thus in terms of sufficient conditions – then “a full understanding
of the fundamental would be, at least in principle, enough to generate an understanding
of the world in its entirety”.13 That is, only within a picture of the fundamental as what
determines what is secondary, we can make sense of the metaphor that the fundamental
is the least that God would need to build the whole reality. This is the sense in which
structures are taken as the most fundamental entities and objects are considered to be
ontologically derivative.
To put this more rigorously, let’s first formalize grounding in some general terms.
Here, I adopt Fine’s (2015) notation:
ϕ1, ϕ2, ...→ ψ
(it is the case that ψ in virtue of it being the case that ϕ1, ϕ2, ...; where ψ,ϕ1, ϕ2, ... are
open sentences). So, I propose to formulate priority-based structuralism (in the case of
two objects determined by a single relation) as follows:
10This is roughly the position defended by French (2014). Ladyman has endorsed a version of this
account in the past, even though he has developed a more sophisticated account in the last years (see
Ladyman et al. (2007), Ladyman (2015, 2016)), which I will not consider further for the purpose of the
present paper.
11I use the term ‘dependence’ to designate a generic relation. In the following, I shall present two
different ways in which dependence can be formulated, i.e. grounding and ontological dependence.
12This is the metaphysical (i.e. non-causal) counterpart of causal determination.
13McKenzie (2020: 507).
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Rx1x2 → (x1 ∧ x2)
(it is the case that x1 ∧ x2 in virtue of it being the case that Rx1x2).
Thus, if we combine this framework with Lam and Esfeld’s proposal, we should say
that in the case of Bohmian mechanics the particles are derivative in nature and they
are metaphysically determined by the physical structure representing the wave function.
However, we can already notice that - just like eliminativism - this option seems to be
quite revisionary. As we have seen in the second section, while formulating Bohmian
mechanics we start from particles and their positions (i.e. the particle configuration
is postulated from the beginning), while the wave function is secondary and specifies
the evolution of the physical system. An asymmetric relation of determination going
from structures to objects, instead, supports the idea that the wave function is the
most fundamental entity. That is, all that has to be posited to construct the whole
reality. This is not a decisive argument against this option, of course, but I believe that
we should resort to revisionary interpretations only if no other metaphysical account is
really viable.14
Moving on to the third standard version of OSR, I shall now consider moderate
OSR (Esfeld & Lam, 2008). We have seen that within priority-based OSR objects are
said to be asymmetrically determined by structures. Thus, only structures are funda-
mental. On the other hand, according to moderate OSR, structures and objects are both
fundamental and symmetrically inter-dependent. How should we formulate this notion
of inter-dependence? Should we resort to grounding as with priority-based OSR? Since
metaphysical determination is meant to express relations of priority, grounding seems to
be unsuitable to characterize moderate OSR.
Indeed, moderate OSR has been usually defined via the notion of ontological depen-
dence (e.g. French (2010)). The notion of ontological dependence at stake is the one
developed by Fine (1995). We can define ontological dependence in the following way, in
terms of essence, or identity: “x [ontologically] depends on y just in case part of what it
is to be x involves y” (Barnes, 2018: 52). This concept of dependence is different from
the one associated with grounding. In fact, while we can take y to ground x only if y is
metaphysically sufficient for x, we should take x to be ontologically dependent on y only
if y is metaphysically necessary for x (Fine, 2015).15 Thus, moderate OSR is the thesis
that objects are ontologically dependent on structures and vice versa. Each category is
necessary for the other one. In French’s words:
The identity of the putative objects is (symmetrically) dependent on that of
the relations of the structure and vice versa. (French, 2010: 104)
We can express this relation formally, using Fine’s (2015) formulation of ontological
dependence:
ϕ←x,y,... ψ1, ψ2, ...
14See also Morganti (2020) on this point.
15As before - this can be taken as the metaphysical (i.e. non-causal) counterpart of causal dependence.
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(it is essential to x, y, . . . satisfying ψ1, ψ2, ... that ϕ be the case; where ψ,ϕ1, ϕ2, ...
are open sentences and x, y, ... are variables). Thus, we can express the relations of
ontological dependence within moderate OSR in the following way (in the case of two
objects symmetrically dependent with a relation R):
(Rx1x2 ←x1,x2 x1, x2) ∧ ((x1 ∧ x2)←R Rx1x2)
(it is essential to x1, x2 that Rx1x2 is the case, and vice versa).
16
Within Esfeld and Lam’s structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics, moder-
ate OSR would amount to the thesis that the wave function (as a physical structure) and
the spatially located particles are inter-dependent. At least prima facie, this account
seems to be slightly less revisionary than the priority-based one. In fact, it grants the
existence of particles and is not committed to the claim that the particles are entirely
derivative on the wave function.
Summing up, so far we can formulate the ontology of the Bohmian structuralist
account in three ways: (i) according to the eliminativist position, the wave function is
all there is; (ii) priority-based OSR claims that the Bohmian particles are determined
by the wave function; and finally, (iii) according to moderate OSR the wave function
and the particles are both fundamental and they are inter-dependent. All that I want to
point out here is that - even though all these positions are, strictly speaking, consistent
- only the last one seems to fit nicely with the presentation of Bohmian mechanics which
I have given in the second section.
Putting OSR aside, in the rest of the paper I shall propose a fourth alternative
structuralist account about the ontology of Bohmian mechanics, based on the framework
of metaphysical coherentism. I will suggest that this is the most natural way in which a
structuralist account of Bohmian mechanics can be formulated.
4 A Coherentist Proposal for Bohmian Mechanics
Calosi and Morganti (2018) and Morganti (2019; 2020) have recently developed a novel
account concerning the metaphysics of quantum entanglement, which they have called
metaphysical coherentism. It is a widespread opinion that the state of (say) two en-
tangled subsystems of the world - e.g. a singlet state like: |ψ〉 = |↑〉1 |↓〉2 − |↓〉1 |↑〉2 -
cannot be understood as the conjunction of the subsystem states. Thus, there is more to
entangled systems than the particles that constitute them. One strategy to understand
the nature of entangled states is to appeal to the OSR framework. The OSRist would
claim that entanglement relations are physical relations, and that either the particles
which instantiate them are metaphysically determined by them, or that the particles
and the entanglement relations are mutually inter-dependent.
On the other hand, Calosi and Morganti (2018) have proposed another alternative,
i.e. metaphysical coherentism. My aim for this section is to apply their account to
16Notice that, to express the dependence of the relation on the objects (i.e. the second conjunct), we
need to use a second-order index R in place of a first-order index. See Fine (2015, ft. 4) on this issue.
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the debate concerning the wave function in Bohmian mechanics. Thus, I shall start by
considering Calosi and Morganti’s account.
According to them, objects should be regarded as the only fundamental category of
entities, but we should also maintain that an essential part of their qualitative profiles
stems from ‘horizontal’17 mutual relations of ontological dependence with other objects.
Thus, the peculiar nature of entangled states is “to be interpreted in terms of symmetric
relations of ontological dependence between certain groups of non-relational entities”
(Calosi and Morganti, 2018: 33), i.e. the particles.
Like moderate OSR, coherentism is expressed in terms of ontological dependence.
However, notice that in the case of OSR the relevant relations of dependence were in-
stantiated between objects and structures. On the other hand, according to coherentism
we should regard objects to be dependent on entities of the same kind. When two objects
are mutually dependent, the qualitative profile of one object (at least partially) depends
on the qualitative profile of the other object, and vice versa, and we cannot wholly char-
acterize the identity of one entity independently from the other. In this way, coherentism
can account for the holistic nature of entangled states. Once we take entangled states
as characterized by symmetric relations of dependence, since entanglement is a really
widespread phenomenon, we end up with what Calosi and Morganti call horizontal webs
of dependence.18
In the end, this resembles the peculiar structuralist account proposed by Linnebo
(2008) in the philosophy of mathematics, which is characterized by the following princi-
ple:
(ODO) Each object in D depends on every other object in D (where D is a certain
domain).
Just as we did with priority-based and moderate OSR, we can formulate coherentism
in a formal way employing Fine’s notation. In particular, we can formally represent
mutual dependence relations as follows (in the case of two symmetrically dependent
objects x1 and x2), in terms of ontological dependence:
(x1 ←x2 x2) ∧ (x2 ←x1 x1)
(it is essential to x2 that x1 is the case, and it is essential to x1 that x2 is the case).
19
I argue that a similar picture can be employed to explain the mutual dependence of
each particle’s velocity on the other particles’ positions in the Bohmian picture. Con-
sider the characterization put forward by the OSRists. For them, the non-local entity
represented by the universal wave function is identified with a fundamental physical
structure that relates all the particles, which in turn inherit their identity from their
place within the structure. On the contrary, according to the coherentist framework one
17In opposition to the ‘vertical’ asymmetric relations of dependence which characterize priority-based
OSR.
18From this the name ‘coherentism’, which is a reference to coherentism in epistemology.
19Cf. Calosi and Morganti (2018: 35). As they point out, it is not simply the existence of (say) x2
that is essential to x1, but the fact that it exists as the very entity it is.
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should consider the Bohmian particles as the most fundamental entities, while maintain-
ing that they ontologically depend on each other - at least concerning their particular
positions.20
Let’s see how we could express more precisely this notion of ontological dependence.
Remember once again that in Bohmian mechanics ‘the velocity of each particle at a time
t depends on the position of each other particle in the configuration at that same time t ’.
As it is rightly pointed out by Lam (2015), there is a dynamical interdependence between
the relata. This is because at each instant t it is the velocity of one particle that depends
on the position of the other particles at that same instant. Thus, its position depends
only “indirectly” on the positions of the other elements of the primitive ontology.
My proposal for a coherentist version of Bohmian mechanics is roughly the follow-
ing:21
At each time t, each particle ontologically depends, with respect to its
position Qk in the configuration, on the velocity of every other particle in
the configuration Q at the same time t, in the way formally described by the
guidance equation.
Summing up, the fact of being that very particle - i.e. the fact of possessing that spe-
cific position value - depends, in the appropriate situation, on the determinate position
properties of all the other particles, in the way formally described by the mathematical
apparatus of Bohmian mechanics, in particular by the guidance equation.
At this point, we can regard the universal wave function as a ‘whole’ stemming from
the horizontal web of dependence relations between the particles that coherentism pos-
tulates. At the formal level, the wave function encodes the totality of those dependence
relations. It should be stressed that the wave function is not, in this view, a funda-
mental physical structure on which the Bohmian particles are dependent on. Rather,
it represents the dependence relations themselves - holding among the particles. Thus,
strictly speaking, the wave function is not a real fundamental ontological posit of the
theory, even though it tracks objective features of the world. In this sense, within the
coherentist framework, the wave function does not seem to have the same ontological
significance that it has in the OSR views.22
20It could be argued that a position like this - i.e. a Bohmian version of the coherentist view - is not
merely an instance of the coherentist framework proposed by Morganti and Calosi, but a refined version
of their account which is actually necessary to make it consistent. Indeed, the coherentist approach to
quantum entanglement, and thus to quantum mechanics, is based on the claim that we can postulate
particles as self-substantive (although interdependent) objects, endowed with intrinsic features. Thus,
it seems to imply the existence of a primitive ontology that can instantiate the relations of ontological
dependence. On the contrary, if one were to assume that the wave function is all there is, then it
would be unclear what are the objects which are supposed to be the fundamental posit of the theory.
Because of this, I believe that Bohmian mechanics - as presented here - is particularly well suited to
accommodate coherentism, and it seems sensible to claim that coherentism actually needs a theory like
this (i.e. Bohmian mechanics with a primitive ontology) to be consistent. Another option, for instance,
could be to develop the coherentist account in the context of the mass-density version of GRW theory
(cf. Allori et al. (2008)). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
21I’m considering non-relativistic quantum mechanics here.
22This renders the coherentist interpretation less ‘realist’ about the ontological status of the wave
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Indeed, one putative difference between coherentism and OSR concerns the status
of the relations which connect the Bohmian particles. On the one hand, according to
the OSR interpretation, the wave function represents a physical structure. On the other
hand, coherentism links the particles via ontological dependence relations between them,
and Morganti stresses that the latter are not on the same ontological footing of the OSR
relations:
Were the coherentist to postulate objects and physical relations, his/her
position would be indistinguishable, say, from the moderate OSRists’. The
emphasis on ontological dependence entails instead that the basic ontological
inventory may well include only objects, even though the whole story con-
cerning their properties will not be told unless it will include some sort of
mutual interrelations. The relevant relations will of course be physical in the
sense that they are captured and described by physics in some way and at
some level, but not in the sense of being as concrete as objects. (Morganti,
2019: 18n)
If he is right, then one could maintain that coherentism is more ontologically parsi-
monious than moderate OSR (but still on the same level as priority-based OSR, which
posits only structures at the most fundamental level). Whereas moderate OSR posits
both structure and objects, coherentism comprises only the latter within its fundamen-
tal ontology. Note that this point relies on the assumption that relations of ontological
dependence are really substantially different from the ‘physical’ relations of OSR. Ad-
mittedly, even though there is a prima facie difference between the two, this can be a
controversial point. I shall not assess this here, since it regards the broader coherentist
framework and it does not fall within the scope of the present discussion, but I would
like to suggest that the proponents of metaphysical coherentism should address this issue
carefully in the future.
Setting aside the latter issue - and to better clarify the nature of the wave function
within the coherentist proposal - it is worth stressing how the coherentist version of
Bohmian mechanics can actually be set apart from other interpretative options which
can be said to bear some similarities with it, to make clear that the coherentist account
can stand alone as a novel proposal, and does not collapse onto other accounts.23
Firstly, I want to focus on the Humean account of Bohmian mechanics that has been
recently discussed in the literature (see e.g. Miller (2014), Esfeld et al. (2013)).24 That
account takes the lead from David Lewis’s doctrine of Humean supervenience, according
to which the world is a “vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact” (Lewis 1986:
ix–x). Roughly, what exists fundamentally is just an arrangement of points instantiating
function than the OSR interpretation. However, as a metaphysical framework, it can still be deemed as
structuralist in flavour due to the modal interdependence which takes place between the objects (which
resembles Linnebo’s mathematical structuralist account expressed in (ODO)). Thus, one could still take
the coherentist interpretation as a refinement of Esfeld and Lam’s initial proposal.
23Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
24See Dewar (2020) for a critical review.
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intrinsic properties and related by spatiotemporal relations, and everything supervenes
on that. Applied to the case of Bohmian mechanics, the Humean view claims that all
that exists fundamentally is a spatiotemporal distribution of Bohmian particles. Then,
according to the Humean approach, the following can be argued:
The universal wave-function and the laws of quantum mechanics supervene
on this distribution [i.e. the distribution of the elements in the primitive
ontology]. They are nothing more than devices of economical bookkeeping,
there being no real connections among the elements of the primitive ontology
(such as a real relation of entanglement); there is only a non-dynamical
background structure of space-time geometry into which these elements are
inserted. (Esfeld et al., 2013: 792)
Similarly to the coherentist proposal, within this account the wave function is con-
ceived as a descriptive device. However, the two approaches are based on very different
metaphysical frameworks.25 In fact, within the coherentist framework, the wave func-
tion stems from a network of modal relations - i.e. relations of ontological dependence
- between the particles. Therefore, the ontology underlying the coherentist account is
modally loaded in a way in which the Humean version could not be. In fact, Humeanism
is - by definition - an approach that rules out necessary connections (and, more gener-
ally, irreducibly modal connections) between entities. On the contrary, coherentism
posits non-supervenient modal connections in the world connecting our objects. This
fact characterizes coherentism as a form of structuralist ontology and distinguishes it
from the Humean account.26
Secondly, it is worth exploring the relationship between the role of the wave function
within the coherentist proposal and the nomological account of the wave function (see
Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013), Solé and Hoefer (2019)). According to the latter view,
the wave function should not be regarded as a substantive physical entity. Instead,
we should take the wave function in Bohmian mechanics as a nomological, law-like
entity. The nomological account shares with the coherentist framework the claim that
the wave function is not a material entity, since this status should be attributed only
to the particles. However, there is a prima facie reason to claim that the coherentist
account is not a version of the nomological interpretation, since the wave function has
no governing role in the former account. That is, the wave function supervenes on the
25Remember that I am taking OSR, as well as coherentism, as metaphysical packages that concern the
whole ontology of our world and not merely the metaphysical status of the wave function. Thus, when
we confront coherentism with other accounts, we have to consider all the metaphysical implications of
the theories.
26To be fair, a structuralist Humean account has been proposed in the literature (see Lyre (2010)
and French (2014, ch. 9)). This account adopts a version of structural realism very different from
those discussed in this paper, which rejects the appeal to natural necessity in the world. Indeed, in this
paper I assumed objective irreducible modality to be a necessary part of OSR. In any case, I believe
that adopting a version of Humean structuralism in our context would be the same as adopting the
Humean account of Bohmian mechanics as presented in this section, and thus I will not discuss that
option separately.
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web of dependence, and does not govern the evolution of the particles per se. Thus,
it seems to have a descriptive nature, not a nomological status. However, one could
argue that having a governing role is not a necessary condition to be a law. Indeed,
the Humean view about the nature of the laws denies that laws have the ability to
govern, and considers laws of nature - very roughly - as salient regularities which can
be tracked in the distribution of the fundamental intrinsic properties (in accordance
with the thesis of Humean supervenience as mentioned above). If one adopts a very
loose version of this account and regards laws as mere bookkeeping devices, supervening
on the fundamental entities - thus, leaving aside the Humean ontology which underlies
the account - then the wave function could be deemed as having a nomological status,
within the coherentist framework.27 In conclusion, if we assume that laws must govern
then the coherentist proposal is not nomological, but, if we reject that assumption and
we adopt a notion of laws of nature akin to the Humean one, then the wave function
could be regarded as having a nomological status within the coherentist view. However,
once again, the view does not collapse into the Humean account discussed before, due
to the inherently structuralist/modal nature of the coherentist ontology, and neither
it collapses into the standard nomological account discussed in the literature, which is
introduced independently from any structuralist ontology (even though it can be deemed
as a peculiar version of that view about the wave function).
Summing up, it can be stressed that the coherentist approach to the ontology of
Bohmian mechanics should be distinguished from the other options available. On the
one hand, it is distinct from the standard OSR interpretation as presented in the previ-
ous section; on the other hand, the coherentist view about Bohmian mechanics is clearly
distinct from the Humean interpretation, and - even though it is compatible with a
nomological understanding of the wave function - the coherentist account does not col-
lapse on the standard nomological interpretation discussed in the literature, due to its
peculiar structuralist ontology.
To conclude, I want to draw some final considerations about coherentism. Firstly,
confronted to moderate OSR, coherentism is more elegant and more intuitive. Moderate
OSR postulates objects, relations, and relations of ontological dependence between them.
On the other hand, coherentism conveys a very similar picture just by relying on objects
and relations of ontological dependence among them.28 Of course, whether this elegance
in the formulation really mirrors a more parsimonious ontology depends on the issue I
just mentioned a few paragraphs above.
Secondly, coherentism is in some sense a form of structuralism - it is simply that the
structure at stake is constituted by webs of ontological dependence. Indeed, just like
OSR, coherentism stresses the inter-dependent nature of the elements in the fundamental
ontology. Thus, even though it can be considered an object-first ontology, it is very
different from a standard object-oriented metaphysics, like the one advocated by David
27Esfeld and Lam (2010, sec. 8.5) argue that within OSR we can regard laws of nature as supervening
on the modal structure of the world. The approach just introduced is very similar to this proposal.
28One reason for which coherentism is more elegant than moderate OSR is that - due to the fact that
coherentism postulates ontological dependences only between objects - the theory can be formulated
using merely first-order logic, whereas moderate OSR requires second-order logic (see footnote 16).
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Lewis (1986). In the light of this, I maintain that the coherentist interpretation of the
wave function that I have set out in this section should not be considered as really an
alternative to Lam and Esfeld’s structuralist interpretation, but as a way to formulate
their basic proposal more precisely. Leaving aside some details - such as the alleged
‘concreteness’ of the structure representing the wave function - the coherentist proposal
is actually consistent with Lam and Esfeld’s core intuitions.
Finally, and most importantly, when it comes to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics,
coherentism seems to be the most straightforward account concerning the nature of the
wave function. In fact, coherentism takes the Bohmian particles as the most fundamental
entities of the theory. In this way, it vindicates Dürr’s and Goldstein’s quotes which I
have reported in the second section - representing roughly the physicists’ point of view
on Bohmian mechanics - according to which “for Bohmian mechanics the particles are
primary, or primitive, while the wave function is secondary, or derivative”. Indeed, within
this interpretation the wave function emerges from the dependence relations between
the particles. In this sense, the coherentist account is much less revisionary than the
priority-based OSR one, which takes particles as derivatives.
5 Conclusion
Lam and Esfeld have proposed to combine Bohmian mechanics with OSR, to put forward
a structuralist account about the ontology of Bohmian mechanics. In this paper, I have
taken the first (and most natural) step towards the development of their structuralist
approach. In fact, as I have pointed out, OSR is not simply a generic framework. Rather,
it comprises a family of different positions. Therefore, my aim in this paper has been
that of formulating the structuralist account in terms of eliminativist, priority-based
and moderate OSR. Furthermore, I have confronted Lam and Esfeld’s proposal with
the framework of metaphysical coherentism. That is, I have sketched a coherentist-
structuralist account of Bohmian mechanics.
While both the three OSRist accounts as well as coherentism are arguably equally
viable alternatives to characterize the structuralist interpretation, at least prima facie
the latter account seems to be in a better shape than the other ones. There is still work
to be done to fully develop that proposal. However, my hope is that what I have shown
so far could prove that this is a work worth pursuing.
Acknowledgements I am very grateful to James Ladyman, Claudio Calosi, Christian
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